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Abstract 
[Excerpt] By the mid-1980s, allegations of union busting had become as common in the upper Midwest's 
labor environment as management claims that competition was forcing it to seek concessions. 
Regardless of management's true intent, local unions from Milwaukee to Minneapolis often lost ground, 
either in contract talks or in keeping their members interested and supportive. They lost because they 
continued to fight the old way, while management was using a barrage of new weapons from corporate 
restructurings and plant modernizations to clever legal maneuvers. But a battle fought in central 
Wisconsin turned the tables on management there in 1987, when 590 members of Local 1791 of the 
International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers (IBEW) mastered the use of previously unheard of 
workplace strategies. 
The new labor tactic saved Local 1791 and its members' jobs. It eventually led management to reverse its 
stand from harsh concessions to a healthy pay and benefit increase, and it sent a significant sign to 
management that labor had learned to fight back the modern way. 
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An Inside Game 
in Wisconsin 
IBEW 1791 vs. Marathon Electric 
*Dale Kurschner 
By the mid-1980s, allegations of union busting had become as com-
mon in the upper Midwest's labor environment as management 
claims that competition was forcing it to seek concessions. 
Regardless of management's true intent, local unions from 
Milwaukee to Minneapolis often lost ground, either in contract 
talks or in keeping their members interested and supportive. They 
lost because they continued to fight the old way, while manage-
ment was using a barrage of new weapons from corporate restruc-
turings and plant modernizations to clever legal maneuvers. But 
a battle fought in central Wisconsin turned the tables on manage-
ment there in 1987, when 590 members of Local 1791 of the 
International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers (IBEW) mastered 
the use of previously unheard of workplace strategies. 
The new labor tactic saved Local 1791 and its members' jobs. 
It eventually led management to reverse its stand from harsh 
concessions to a healthy pay and benefit increase, and it sent a 
significant sign to management that labor had learned to fight back 
the modern way. 
• Dale Kurschner is a staff writer for CityBusiness in Minneapolis, Minnesota. 
During IBEW 1791's battle with Marathon Electric, Kurschner covered the story 
as a reporter for the Wausau Daily Herald. 
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Demands for Concessions 
To most of the 590 shop workers at the Marathon Electric 
Manufacturing Corp. headquarters plant in Wausau, Wisconsin, 
a request by management for concessions in September 1987 
almost seemed justifiable. Growing competition from the global 
marketplace had given this manufacturer of generators and small 
electric motors little choice but to seek a 20%, $3-an-hour cut in 
labor costs, management told the workers. And they were told 
there was a real threat of their jobs moving to the South, where 
the company could get cheaper labor. 
In justifying their request, Marathon Electric executives pointed 
to the loss of one of their largest customers a year earlier. They 
also pointed to a wage study the company participated in with 
13 of its competitors. The results indicated Marathon Electric 
employees were overpaid compared with national averages. 
Both points, some employees thought, were reasons why they 
should help the management they had been good "team 
members" with only a few months earlier. 
But leaders of IBEW Local 1791 saw the contract offer as the 
first distinct sign that the company's ultimate goal was to bust 
the union. Things had been looking that way for a while, and the 
local had been preparing to counter if need be with a new weapon 
—inside strategies. 
A three-year internal public relations campaign by Marathon 
Electric's management had significantly weakened the strength 
of Local 1791 by early 1987. Almost daily, shop supervisors had 
given union members briefings on and explanations for Marathon 
Electric's status. Their words focused on "team work" between 
management and individual workers, not through their union. And 
workers were told they were "the best in the industry." 
At the same time, work had gradually been moved from Wausau 
to Marathon Electric plants in Lima and Bowling Green, Ohio, 
and in West Plains and Lebanon, Missouri. Shop employment 
levels had dropped from more than 1,000 seven years earlier. 
Dave Wadinski, Local 1791's president from 1983 to 1988, said 
he wasn't sure of management's intentions before negotiations 
started on a new three-year contract in July 1987. All he was sure 
of was that membership interest was waning and management 
was definitely after something. 
"I didn't really see signs that they were going to bust the union, 
but I used that concern as a foundation to get support back from 
the members," Wadinski later admitted. But his theory quickly 
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became reality once formal bargaining sessions began. "The first 
real sign was when we met in bargaining and they offered us a 
$3-an-hour cut in wages," he said. 
"We didn't think the first contract offer was really serious," said 
Randy Olmsted, an officer with Local 1791 who became presi-
dent in 1988. "When we got into August, they wouldn't move and 
that's when we started getting nervous." 
From that point forward, the local's leadership told its members 
that they should focus on one thing: saving their union. 
"We thought they would not bargain fairly, (that they'd) force 
us out on the street or on strike, fill the place with scabs and then 
we would be out for good," Wadinski said. 
Convincing the local's membership was another story, however. 
Marathon Electric's management had done a good job of convin-
cing many union members to trust it. And getting full unity among 
the local's members was necessary before workplace strategies 
could work. 
"That was the hard part," Wadinski said. "Some of the workers 
believed what management was telling them. We could see interest 
in the union was fading." 
Organizing the Membership 
Local 1791's way of countering that was through a well manag-
ed, aggressive group of 22 union stewards and officers who spent 
time each day going over information with individual or small 
groups of shop workers. The goal was to clarify what Local 1791 
considered to be misleading information, and to show manage-
ment for what it was. 
"The employer started a program that if you didn't miss a day 
of work in a year, you'd get something for it," Wadinski said. 
"People were thinking that was great, but for people who hadn't 
missed work for seven years, they'd get a calculator." 
"We turned it around and said to the employer and to the 
workers that it was an insult, and instead, they should give those 
workers a $500 bonus," he said. "People started giving back the 
calculators.'' 
While the issue may seem small, it was significant for Local 1791 
in that it helped the local's leaders gain back ties to its members. 
There were other initial skirmishes that were fought before war 
broke out between labor and management. 
Ingrained in the minds of Marathon Electric's employees was 
the very probable scenario of their jobs being eliminated. Manage-
ment had voiced the possibility of moving the Wausau plant's 
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work South, where Marathon Electric had done all of its expand-
ing during the 1980s. 
But Wadinski and fellow union officers saw the idea as a trap 
for Local 1791's members. If the workers believed saving their 
jobs was the most important goal, they could lean toward conces-
sions more easily. Local 1791 instead worked at convincing the 
workers that if Marathon Electric would move down South, "we 
at least wouldn't go broke on them moving," Wadinski said. 
Having spent weeks preparing members of Local 1791 for poten-
tial union-busting tactics by management, the shop workers were 
ready for the battle that started with the expiration of their three-
year contract on September 1, 1987. 
The union's leaders were also ready, according to Randy 
Olmsted. "The biggest key was our enthusiasm," he said. "We had 
an eight-man negotiating committee and we were really wrapped 
up in what we were doing." 
Local 179l's negotiating team brought three contract offers to 
the membership in September. The first two were voted down 
by more than 90% of the workers, and the third was the version 
management would later implement after declaring an impasse. 
"We made copies of every proposal and had every steward take 
it out to the people and tell them about it. That way, we found 
out how they felt about it (before the union voted]," Wadinski said. 
Between August and mid-November, Local 1791 had made four 
proposals, the last two of which would have given Marathon Elec-
tric $1.2 million and $3.2 million in concessions over three years. 
The last union proposal also called for converting the shop's piece 
work jobs to day work jobs, doing away with the incentive pay 
that 70 percent of the shop workers were used to getting. 
Marathon Electric's management refused to even discuss the 
proposals. It also refused to open its books to the union so that 
the negotiating committee could justify Marathon Electric's con-
cession requests to Local 1791's members. 
Four months after negotiations over a new three-year contract 
had begun, Marathon Electric declared an impasse and imple-
mented its last contract offer on November 12, 1987. The move 
cut wages by 14%, or an average of $1.14 an hour. Cuts in benefits 
reduced average pay by about $3 an hour. 
Management's actions had unfolded as the union leadership had 
predicted, and Local 1791's members were visibly frustrated and 
disappointed. It became even more evident that union busting was 
the goal. 
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The Fightback 
Informational pickets began as soon as the last contract offer 
was implemented. So did the effort by a group of eight union 
stewards to contact 156 local businesses in Wausau to have them 
display "We Support Local 1791" posters. About 100 businesses 
chose to display the signs. 
"We kept track of who supported us and who didn't," Wadin-
ski said. "People who supported us, we would shop there or buy 
gas there in a group on weekends. Those who didn't support us 
didn't get our business and we let everyone know who they were." 
Local 1791 also printed up a form letter and gave it to every 
shop worker. The letter was to inform the employees' banks and 
creditors that they might have to file for protection from creditors 
under a chapter of the Federal Bankruptcy Act because of 
Marathon Electric's pay cuts. The letters helped to increase 
negative public opinion toward the company. 
Counter measures began inside Marathon Electric as well, as 
workers implemented several workplace strategies. They included: 
• Asking for a written job description and working only 
as much as required—no more, no less. There was no 
more helping supervisors or pitching in to improve pro-
duction or quality. 
• Reporting all illnesses and injuries, no matter how slight. 
• Documenting and dating every conversation or state-
ment that was made to a superior. 
• Asking to see one's personnel file at least twice a year. 
• Wearing blaze orange clothing as a sign of solidarity (it 
was widely believed that company president Russ Hale 
hated blaze orange). 
• Leaving work during breaks to march in protest around 
Marathon Electric's plant. 
• Taking 15-minute bathroom breaks in mass, effectively 
shutting down the plant at various times during each shift. 
• Holding sick days, where a large group of workers would 
call in sick. 
Local 1791 leaders also were successful in working a connec-
tion to get one of the toughest inspectors from the Occupational 
Safety and Health Administration to inspect Marathon Electric. 
"He spent three days, and only came up with $15,000 to $20,000 
in fines," Olmsted said. "But the company had to change a lot 
of machinery to comply." 
On the work-to-rule side, Wadinski figured about 70% of the 
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shop workers actually worked to rule. "On one job a guy operated, 
they had to move two parts of his job to two different stations." 
This resulted in a substantial loss of incentive pay. "He sacrificed 
a great deal." 
Working at 100% of incentive, rather than the 140% to 150% 
they had worked at prior to the work-to-rule campaign, meant 
additional wage cuts for those who participated. 
Local 1791 leaders encouraged the other 30% of the shop 
workers to do what they could. "We didn't want to make them 
feel like outcasts," Wadinski said. "Some people truly couldn't 
afford to lose the money." 
The stewards, Wadinski and Olmsted said, were the catalysts 
that kept the workers organized and fired up. Each steward stayed 
in near-daily contact with union officers and with a group of 
employees, keeping the lines of communications open for answer-
ing members' questions and for organizing members into pickets 
or marches. 
By March 1988, however, workers had grown tired of the bat-
tle. A few, it was reported, were trying to negotiate behind the 
union's back and were trying to recruit other members. 
The inside strategies had succeeded in pulling Marathon Elec-
tric's production rate down by nearly 40%, making the company's 
tough financial condition almost unbearable. Both sides realized 
things had gone nearly to the point of no return, as was reflected 
in a newspaper article at the time. 
"Loyalty toward Wausau as a manufacturing facility is dimin-
ishing with every day that goes by and, quite frankly, if our 
employees in Wausau are no longer interested in our jobs, we 
know of plenty of other people who are," the company's vice presi-
dent of administration told the press. 
Wadinski was just as pessimistic: "Marathon Electric will never 
have a contract with its employees in Wausau because they want 
one dictated to the workers and shoved down their throats. We'll 
do whatever we have to do. If they ruin our lives, we'll ruin their 
corporation. It won't stop here." 
Looking back today, Olmsted said the situation was tough to 
manage for Local 1791's leaders. "We were looking at the possibil-
ity of losing. Marathon Electric, I believe, was going to make a 
big move in Wausau because we were really killing their business. 
We were turning out terrible products and the long-term reper-
cussions were going to be devastating to them." 
For that reason, Local 1791 called a two-week truce in March 
1988, and workers went back to working as hard as they could. 
Within weeks, negotiations had resumed and a settlement was 
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reached. Shop workers were given job security, a profit-sharing 
plan, a signing bonus of $750, and one holiday that otherwise 
would have been cut. But management kept its wage cuts as 
prescribed in its implemented offer. 
Once More, With Feeling 
"That was probably one of the biggest mistakes we made," 
Olmsted said. "There was a lot of bitterness after the contract was 
accepted and people went back to work with a contract nobody 
wanted." 
That bitterness continued to fuel the workplace strategy of work-
ing only to one's job description—with or without the direction 
of Local 1791's leadership. Morale continued to drop in the shop, 
and the cost of saving the union started to wear on everyone. 
"After the 1988 settlement was the toughest time," Olmsted said. 
"Grievances started piling in and a lot of hostilities between the 
union and the company were formed." During Olmsted's three 
years as Local 1791's president, there were 383 grievances filed. 
The normal rate had been about 15 a year before the end of the 
three-year contract in September 1987. "It was an every day battle 
and you didn't know what you were going to run into," he said. 
Marathon Electric's management, however, began a process that 
Local 1791 would later describe as its biggest mistake: it began 
building up its order 
base as soon as the 
March settlement was 
reached, anticipat-
ing that work would 
return to normal in 
the plant by late 1988. 
But production didn't 




Hale, meanwhile , 
suddenly left his post 
and was replaced in 
December 1988 by 
long-time Marathon 
Electric veteran and 
previous vice presi-
dent John Slayton. 
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Olmsted said that about four months after the change in com-
mand, he received a phone call at home from someone he believes 
was Hale. "The guy on the phone asked me 'what are you going 
to do about Marathon Electric?' and it sounded just like Russ 
Hale," he said. "He told me how they had screwed us over, that 
they didn't need the money, and after that, things started eating 
at me." 
Olmsted then decided that members of Local 1791 needed to 
encourage Marathon Electric in its pursuit of higher order volume 
because, he said, "we knew damn well that if they got their 
customers back and we went to war again, they would never get 
them back again." 
By mid-summer of 1989, Olmsted had sent Marathon Electric's 
executives a letter saying that because the overall economy nation-
wide had improved, and because the company's hardships had 
faded, the shop workers deserved a pay increase. "We went in 
and told them flat out that they were going to have to give these 
people something back, and if they didn't, it would get terrible 
again in the shop," Olmsted said. 
By September, both sides had negotiated a new contract that 
gave the 590 shop workers a 16% increase in wages, all of their 
holidays back, significant increases in pension benefits, an increase 
in accident benefits, and a $250 signing bonus. 
"Surprisingly enough, the new package was passed 260 to 218, 
and we had 100 members who didn't even vote on it," Olmsted 
said. 
Since the first of this year, productivity is back to 1987 levels 
at Marathon Electric, Olmsted said. Marathon Electric has finished 
investing $10 million into capital improvements at the facility and 
is planning to stick another $10 million into it fairly soon. 
"It's just getting better out there now," he said. "But some of 
those people will never be the same again. Some started to realize 
that they were there to make a living," not support the company 
with extra effort. 
Wadinski, Olmsted, negotiating committee member Tom Bittner 
and others also ended up paying a price for their efforts. Besides 
pay cuts, some of them became targets of managers who were 
unhappy with their use of the workplace strategies. And public 
support, though strong throughout most of the three-year battle, 
was often taxing to try and maintain. 
"It was one thing to read about these things, and to listen to 
people talk about them," Olmsted said about the need for, and 
use of, workplace strategies. "It was another to live it." • 
